The applicability of domestic laws in cross-border employment situations and current developments in employment-related anti-discrimination-law. by Weigert, Daniel-Rene
 1 
 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
Lund University 
 
 
 
Daniel-René Weigert 
 
 
The applicability of domestic laws in 
cross-border employment situations 
and current developments in 
employment-related anti-
discrimination-law. 
 
 
 
 
JAEM01 Master Thesis 
 
European Business Law 
15 higher education credits 
 
Supervisor: Xavier Groussot 
 
Term: Spring 2013 
 
 62 
Table of Contents 
1 SUMMARY 2 
2 ABBREVIATIONS 3 
3 SCOPE OF THE ANALYSIS 4 
3.1 General 4 
3.2 Possible cross-border situations 4 
4 SOURCES OF LABOUR LAW 6 
5 INTERESTS OF NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 8 
6 APPLICABLE LAWS 10 
6.1 Private law: Rome I 10 
a) Introduction 10 
b) Agreement 10 
c) Favourability-clause 11 
d) Lex loci laboris 11 
e) Employing branch 11 
f) ECJ C-383/95 (Rutten, 1997), ECJ C-29/10, Koelzsch, 2011) 12 
g) ECJ C‑384/10 (Voogsgeerd, 2012) 12 
h) General clause 13 
i) Art. 9 13 
j) Indispositive laws 13 
k) Wide scope of Art. 8 14 
6.2 Directive on services in the internal market 2006/123 14 
6.3 The relationship between EU labour law and domestic labour law 14 
6.4 Jurisdiction 15 
6.5 Interim result 16 
7 POSTING OF WORKERS 17 
7.1 Legal protection of the home country 17 
7.2 Introduction to the PWD 17 
7.3 Indispensible national laws 18 
7.4 Other problems and concretions of the PWD 19 
a) No minimum protection 19 
b) Lack of definitions 19 
c) Collective Agreements 20 
 63 
d) ”Nordic Model” 20 
e) Fundamental freedoms 20 
8 HISTORY OF JURISDICTION WITH REGARDS TO THE 
POSTING OF WORKERS 21 
8.1 Freedom to provide services 21 
8.2 Horizontal direct effect 22 
8.3 Jurisdiction 22 
a) ECJ C-113/89 (Rush Portuguesa, 1990); ECJ C-43/93 (Vander 
Elst, 1994) 22 
b) ECJ C-369/96 (Guiot, 1999) 22 
c) ECJ C-369/96, (Arblade, 1999) 23 
d) ECJ C-165/98 (Mazzoleni/Guillaume, 2001) 23 
e) ECJ C-49/98 (Finalarte, 2001) 23 
f) ECJ C-164/99, (Portugaia Construções, 2002) 24 
g) ECJ C-341/05 (Laval, 2008) 24 
h) ECJ C-346/06 (Rüffert, 2008) 27 
i) C-319/06 (Commission v. Luxemburg, 2008) 27 
9 FREEDOM OT ESTABLISHMENT 29 
9.1 ECJ C-438/05 (Viking Line, 2007) 29 
a) Facts 29 
b) Horizontal Direct Effect 29 
c) Scope 31 
d) Discussed exeptions 31 
e) Justification of the restrictions 33 
f) Critique 34 
9.2 Problem of Company Codetermination 35 
10 LABOUR LEASING 36 
10.1 Differentiation between posted and leased workers 36 
10.2 ECJ-Jurisdiction with regards to Labour Lease 36 
a) ECJ C-279/80 (Webb, 1983): 37 
b) ECJ C-279/00 (Commission vs.Italy) 37 
c) ECJ C-493/99 (Commission v. Germany, 2001) 37 
11 CROSS-BORDER MERGERS, MOVEMENTS AND 
TRANSFERS OF UNDERTAKINGS 38 
11.1 Situations 38 
a) Cross-Border Takeover 38 
b) Cross-Border Merger 38 
 64 
c) Cross-Border transfer 38 
11.2 ECJ C-242/09 (Albron Catering, 2010) 39 
12 FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS 41 
12.1 ECJ C-202/11 (Las, 2013) 42 
12.2 Horizontal effect 42 
13 SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 44 
13.1 Outline 44 
13.2 ECJ C-443/11 (Jeltes and others, 2013): 45 
13.3 ECJ C-379/09 (Casteels/British Airways, 2011) 45 
13.4 ECJ C-542/09 (Kommission / Niederlande, 2012) 45 
14 SOCIAL SECURITY LAW 46 
15 FOREIGN CIRCUMSTANCES IN DOMESTIC CASES 47 
16 NON-DISCRIMINATION 48 
16.1 1.Introduction 48 
16.2 2.Cases 48 
a) ECJ C-144/04 (Mangold, 2005) 48 
b) ECJ C-411/05 (Palacios de la Villa, 2007) 50 
c) ECJ C-300/06 (Voß, 2007) 50 
d) ECJ C-88/08 (Hütter, 2009) 50 
e) ECJ C-341/08 (Petersen, 2010) 50 
f) ECJ C-555/07 (Kücükdeveci, 2010) 50 
g) ECJ C-250/09 (Georgiev, 2010) 51 
h) ECJ C-45/09 (Rosenbladt, 2010) 51 
i) ECJ C-159/10 and C-160/10 (Fuchs,2011) 51 
j) ECJ C-499/08 (Andersen, 2010) 51 
k) ECJ C-447/09 (Prigge/Lufthansa, 2011) 52 
l) ECJ C-297/10 and C 298/10 (Hennings, 2011) 52 
m) ECJ C-132/11 (Tyrolean Airways, 2012) 52 
n) ECJ C-152/11, (Odar, 2012) 52 
o) ECJ C-141/11 (Hörnfeldt, 2012) 52 
17 SUMMARY: HOW TO DEAL WITH CROSS-BORDER 
EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS 54 
Auf „Junk” folgt „Mangold” - Europarecht verdrängt deutsches Arbeitsrecht 56 
Neues Internationales Arbeitsvertragsrecht 56 
 60 
Table of Cases 
C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 1970 
C-36/74 Walrave/Koch v. AUCI 1974 
C-13/76 Dona v Montero 1976 
C-43/75 Defrenne 1976 
C-120/78 Cassis de Dijon 1979 
C-279/80 Webb 1983 
C-152/84 Marshall 1986 
C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa 1990 
C-292/89 Antonissen 1991 
C-392/92 Christel Schmidt 1994 
C-43/93 Vander Elst 1994 
C-415/93 Bosman 1995 
C-55/94 Gebhard 1995 
C-272/94 Guiot 1996 
C-383/95 Rutten 1997 
C-120/95 Decker 1998 
C-67/96 Albany 1999 
C-369/96 Arblade 1999 
C-369/96 Guiot 1999 
C-281/98 Angonese 2000 
C-493/99 Commission v. Germany 2001 
C-165/98   Mazzoleni/Guillaume 2001 
C-49/98 Finalarte 2001 
BAG 5 AZR 255/00  2001 
C-208/00 Überseering 2002 
C-279/00 Commission v. Italy 2002 
C-208/00 Überseering 2002 
C-164/99 Portugaia Construções 2002 
C-112/00 Schmidberger 2003 
C-36/02 Omega 2004 
C 499/04 Werhof 2006 
C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa 2007 
C-300/06 Voß 2007 
C-438/05 Viking Line 2008 
C-94/07 Raccanelli 2008 
C-341/05 Laval 2008 
C-346/06 Rüffert 2008 
C-319/06 Commission v. Luxemburg 2008 
BAG 10 AZR 355/07  2008 
C-88/08 Hütter 2009 
C-466/07 Klarenberg 2009 
C-341/08 Petersen 2010 
C-555/07 Kücükdeveci 2010 
C-250/09 Georgiev 2010 
C-45/09 Rosenbladt 2010 
 61 
C-499/08 Andersen 2010 
C-242/09 Albron Catering 2010 
C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais SASP 2010 
C-297/10, C 298/10 Hennings 2011 
C-159/10, C-160/10 Fuchs 2011 
C-379/09 Casteels/British Airways 2011 
C-108/10 Scattolon 2011 
C-463/09 CLECE 2011 
C‑384/10 Voogsgeerd  2011 
BAG AZR 37/10  2011 
C-144/04 Hörnfeldt 2012 
C-132/11 Tyrolean 2012 
C-152/11 Odar 2012 
C-141/11 Hörnfeldt 2012 
C-542/09 Commission/Netherlands 2012 
C-443/11 Jeltes and others 2013 
C-202/11 Las 2013 
C-617/10 Åkerberg-Fransson 2013 
C-426/11 Parkwood-Leisure Ltd. 2013 
  2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
1 Summary 
This analysis presents the current legal situation in European and domestic 
labour law, as well as International Private law, with regards to cross-border 
employment situations. 
 
It will present in which various ways cross-border employment can occur 
(Chapter 3). After introducing the general clash of interest between the 
European Union and its Member States with regards to cross-border laws 
(5) the relevant legal provisions will be presented. It will be dealt with 
International Privat Law (6), with relevant European Directives (7, 10, 11) 
or Regulations (13) and with primary EU law (8, 9, 12, 14). In each chapter 
the relevant jurisdiction of the ECJ will be taken into account. 
 
It will be shown that the legislation and jurisdiction with regards to cross-
border employment has been and presumably will be subject to significant 
changes. The EU – legislatively as well as judicially – interferes more and 
more in this field. It will be shown that the freedom of workers as well as 
employees, as well as legal certainty have been improved significantly in the 
past, but also that there are still areas of uncertainty as well as unsolved 
clashes of interests, mainly with regards to employee protection and/or 
social security on the one hand, and a free market on the other hand. It will 
also be shown that the influence of the ECJ on domestic jurisdiction in this 
field has increased massively, there is a shift from domestic courts to the 
ECJ with regards to guidelines on cross-border employment.
1
 It will be seen 
that the ECJ tends to value the internal market higher than national 
legislators in cross-border situations. Despite the valuations of the ECJ 
being problematic, it will be seen that a shift towards the European level is 
crucial for a fair balance between employee protection and a european 
economic integration in cross-border situations. 
 
Due to its practical significance, a large number of judgements and an 
intense debate about it, it will also be shown that the ECJ grants itself much 
power with regards to the topic of age discrimination. This field is, 
especially since 2005 (Mangold-case) in constant change and will probably 
irritate all parties of European law much more in the near future. 
 
In the end, it will be summed up in which situations which laws will – 
generally – apply. 
 
                                                 
1
 ”ECJ“ 
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2 Abbreviations 
BAG Bundesarbeitsgericht (German 
Federal Labour Court)  
EC European Community 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
EU European Union 
FSU Finnish Seamen’s Union 
ITWF International Transport Workers 
Federation 
PWD European Posting of Workers 
Directive 
TAWD EU Temporary and Agency 
Workers Directive 
TFEU Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union 
TUD Transfers of Undertakings Directive 
TzBfG Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz 
(German “Part-time and fix-term 
employment law”) 
 4 
3 Scope of the analysis 
3.1 General 
Due to the enlargenment of the European Union, increasing international 
dependence economically and increasing gaps between Member States with 
high unemployment and such with low unemployment since the economic 
crisis, more and more often workers are lend out, are posted abroad or cross 
national borders for employment purposes in other ways.
2
 
 
All these situations and their treatment in International Private Law, EU law 
and domestic labour laws (to some extent also social laws) will be assessed. 
It is important to point out that this analysis will not deal with the free 
movement of workers in general. Its goal is to focus on situations in which 
– for various reasons – different domestic laws might collide. Typical cases 
in which an employee wants to move abroad in order to work abroad, might 
be complicated with regards to the free movement of workers, but are 
simple in terms of collision laws. This thesis wants to present cases with 
specific cross-border employment situations from a European perspective. 
 
Due to the current immense relevance and numerous ECJ-judgements that 
set limits to national legislators and courts, the topic of age discrimination 
will be dealth with as well. 
3.2 Possible cross-border situations 
Cross-border situations commonly occur in the following ways
3
: 
 An employer can send an employee abroad to work temporarily 
 An employer can send an employee abroad permanently, means that the 
place of work is permanently in another state than where the 
employment contract was concluded 
 An employee occasionally crosses the border to work abroad, e.g. pilots. 
 An employee permanently works parallel in two countries 
 An employee is employed and works in one country, but lives in 
another (Cross-border commuters) 
 An employer can lease an employee out to a lending company abroad 
 An employee can suspend the original employment contract temporarily 
and work for another firm abroad temporarily under a new 
employment contract. 
 Changes on the side of the employer, who can be 
o Taken over by a foreign company by a share deal 
o Merged with a foreign company 
o Sold to a company abroad by an asset deal 
                                                 
2
 Otto, EuZA 2012, 137 (Göttinger Forum zum Arbeitsrecht: Auslandsarbeit) 
3
 Spieler, EuZA 2012, 169, 177 
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 An employer actually moves a work site due to such a takeover/merger 
 An employee works abroad and concludes another employment 
contract there (”split contract” situation)4 
 An employee works, lives and is employed in the same country, but 
foreign circumstances might play a role in the application of domestic 
laws anyway. 
After the following analysis, I will get back to these situations and sum up 
what must be assessed in each case. 
                                                 
4
 Spieler, EuZA 2012, 169, 170 
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4 Sources of labour law 
Firstly, I want to present the sources of labor law that can be problematic in 
cross-border employment in the first place. Where necessary, I will use 
Germanys labor law as an example. 
 
Despite the obvious contract as a source of rights and duties in employment 
relations, there are several hierarchical sources of legal provisions 
concerning labour. 
 
On domestic level, there are, above contracts, work council agreements, 
negotiated between the works council and an individual employer. Above 
that, there are collective labour agreements, negotiated between labour 
unions and employers or employer unions.
 5
  Both can have normative 
effect.
6
 
 
Above that (even though this hierarchical order has exceptions, collective 
labour agreements can alternate dispositive law) are domestic legal 
provisions.
7
 
 
Above that there are constitutional provisions, in which for example the 
right to strike can be regulated.
8
 
 
On supranational level there are provisions regarding labour law for 
example in the European Convention of Human Rights.
9
 
 
On the level of the European Community there is an increasing amount of 
secondary legislation in shape of regulations that relate to labour law.
10
 
Secondary labour law majorily consists of regulations that have been 
adopted into national legislation, though. Directives with regards to labour 
law are an exception.
11
 
 
Finally, there is primary EU legislation, such as the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that includes laws concering 
labour, for example the free movement of workers in Art.45 TFEU
12
, and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ECFR), 
which is formally binding since Art.6 TFEU took effect in December 
2009
13
. 
 
                                                 
5
 Municher Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, § 5 Rd.5 
6
 Municher Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, § 5 Rd.5 
7
 Municher Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, § 5 Rd.5 
8
 Municher Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, § 5 Rd.5 
9
 Municher Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, § 10 Rd.2 
10
 Municher Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, § 10 Rd.15 
11
 Riesenhuber, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht, p.9 
12
 Municher Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, § 10 Rd.10; Riesenhuber, Europäisches 
Arbeitsrecht, p.7; Däubler, Instruments of EC Labour Law, p.151 ff. 
13
 NZA 2011, 258, 258 
 7 
With regards to the latter there has recently been published the ECJ-ruling 
”Åkerberg-Fransson”14, in which the ECJ widened the scope of the Charta 
of fundamental rights significantly. Whilst formerly national legal 
provisions or administrative acts were subject to the scope of the 
fundamental rights charta only if they were a result of the implementation of 
European law, the ECJ has now stated that national measures fall under the 
scope of EU law already, if the national act has just any relation to duties 
that derive from EU law. That would mean that practially all domestic laws 
that have any – even wide – relation to duties deriving from EU law must be 
assessed with regards to their conformity with EU fundamental rights. A 
problematic consequence would be that – sooner or later – it might happen 
that a domestic norm must be interpreted in a certain way to be in 
accordance with domestic constitutional law, but interpreted in another way 
to be in conformity with EU fundamental rights. In this case, it will lead to 
an evident clash of power between national constitutional courts and the 
ECJ. The German constitutional court has recently commented
15
 on 
”Åkerberg-Fransson”, basically stating a disagreement with the ECJ. It 
explicitly said that a purely factual relationship to EU law was not enough to 
make domestic provisions subject to an ECJ assessement of EU 
fundamental rights, but only if EU law ”determines” German law. This will, 
in practice, mean that – for the moment – whoever applies German labour 
law must be aware of the possibility that the norms accordance with EU 
fundamental rights will bee assessed, even if the norm is not a result of 
implemention of a regulation or directive. For example, the question of ”age 
discrimination” will in the future (according to the ECJ) not only be 
assessed with regards to implementations of EU law (more on that under 
”Mangold”, Chapter 16.2 a) ) , but with regards to all German laws that 
have any relation to EU law. For legal science it means that the evident 
clash of power between the ECJ and national constitutional courts since 
”Solange II” has become even wider and added another facette. 
 
                                                 
14
 ECJ C-617/10, 26.2.2013 
15
 BVG 1 BvR 1215/07, April 2013 
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5 Interests of national and 
european legislation 
The main political question in European employment- and labour law is, 
generally formulated, weather the state aims for a strong or a weak 
employee protection. Economically, a strong employment protection makes 
work in a member state more expensive, either directly (e.g. by minimum 
wages), or indirectly (e.g. because dismissals cost more, when law does not 
make it possible to dismiss an employee). Therefore, economically stronger 
countries tend to have stronger employment protection laws, because 
companies in economically strong countries are more likely to be able to 
afford expensive labour. As a consequence, the level of employee protection 
in the European member states varies significantly. In particular, the 
northern European countries (e.g. Sweden) are known for having very 
strong employment protection laws, whilst e.g. the new member states of 
the EU in Eastern Europe tend to have weaker protection. 
 
The basic clash of the interest of the EU and Member States with a strong 
employment protection is that the member states want their domestic 
employment standards to be imposed even on workers from abroad. The 
chain of economic logic is this: 
 
A company from abroad has a weaker employment protection, thereby 
labour is cheaper to get for them, thereby they are able to offer their services 
for cheaper prices, thereby customers in well-protective countries are more 
likely to make a contract with cheaper companies abroad, who then send 
their workers across the border temporarily. This would be a competition 
disadvantage of domestic employers. Politically, this danger might motivate 
national parliaments to weaken its domestic employment protection level 
and thereby cheapen the prices of domestic companies. 
 
From a Unions point of view, a goal of European politics is the adaptation 
of the common market. The exchange and movement of goods, services, 
undertakings and workers is a general goal of the Union, reflected 
fundamentally in the European economic freedoms. Therefore, the EU does 
not want to give national authorities the opportunity to protect the own 
market from foreign workers. It is an undebated jurisdiction of the ECJ, 
concerning all European freedoms, that this comprises not only „directly“ 
protective laws (e.g. a prohibition to work for a foreign worker), but also 
implicit and indirect protection. That means that the application of domestic 
laws on foreign employees could have the effect of a significant economic 
disadvantage for foreign firms and thereby a protection of the own labour 
market. If, for example, the foreign firm was obliged to afford expenses that 
rich domestic firms can afford, but economically weaker foreign 
undertakings not, then it was not possible for foreign undertakings to offer 
their services in well-protected countries. 
 
 9 
To sum it up: The principle of the country of origin enforces competition, 
but comprises the risk of a derogation of social standards in Europe. This is 
the underlying conflict of interests between the EU and member states with 
strong customer protection. It is thereby clear that – to the extent possible – 
national courts are more likely to have the tendency to apply domestic laws, 
whereas the ECJ is more likely to support the country-of-origin-principle.. 
 
 10 
6 Applicable laws 
First, I want to present which laws are generally applicable to each cross 
border employment relation. Therefore, it must be differentiated between 
three questions: 
 Firstly, which private laws apply to the contractual employment 
relationship between employer and employee? 
 Secondly, which public laws govern the circumstances of the 
labour? 
 And thirdly, how does European labor law relate to domestic labor 
law. 
 
6.1 Private law: Rome I 
a) Introduction 
With „private law“ it is meant which law governs the relationship between 
the employer and the employee that derives from their employment contract. 
The answer to this is found in International Private Law, namely in Articles 
8 and 9 of the Rome I Regulation
16
. Rome I applies to employment 
agreements concluded on or after 17 December 2009. Before that, national 
collision laws regulated the issue according to the predecessor of ”Rome I”, 
the ”Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations” from 
1980, which was not directly binding, but implemented in national 
legislation.
17
 The following analysis will focus on ”Rome I”, because firstly 
the changes are insignificant
18
, and secondly it can be assumed that the ECJ-
jurisdiction concerning ”Rome I” will also be applied with regards to 
situations concerning its predecessors. It applies to all EU Member States 
except of Denmark.
19
 Nevertheless, other Member States exxcept of 
Denmark apply ”Rome I” even in cases with a connection to Denmark in 
accordance to Art. 2 Rome I, which allows this practice even if ”Rome I” is 
not law of the respective Member State.
20
 
 
b) Agreement 
As its predecessor, Rome I prioritizes the agreement of the parties on the 
law applicable to the employment relation (Art. 8 I).
21
 
 
                                                 
16
 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008; Löwisch, Labor Law in Europe, p.101, 114; Drummonds, Global employment law 
for the practicing lawyer,  p.5; Thüsing, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht,p.278 
17
 NZA 2011, 258, 258 
18
 NZA 2011, 258, 258 
19
 Deinert, Neues Internationales Arbeitsvertragsrecht, RdA 2009, 144, 145 
20
 NZA 2010, 1380, 1381 
21
 Nielsen, European Labour Law, p.177; Löwisch, Labor Law in Europe, p.101, 114; 
Thüsing, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht,p.278 
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c) Favourability-clause 
In labour law, there is the risk, that the parties circumvent national employee 
protection laws by choosing a less protective law to govern the contract. 
That is why Rome I defines an exception by Art. 8 I (2), which ensures that 
employers cannot circumvent national domestic employee protection laws. 
It says that it must be ascertained which law would be applicable without an 
agreement according to Art. 8 II-IV, and then a favourability-comparison 
must be made between this law and the law chosen by the parties
22
, and it 
must be assessed if this foreign law was – according to its own jurisdiction – 
indispositive. If all those conditions are met, the foreign law remains 
applicable despite an alternatiing agreement of the parties.
23
 
How this favourability-comparison must be applied has not yet been 
decided by the ECJ. Theoretical possibilities are the comparison of 
individual norms, or a norm-complex or of the complete competing 
legislations.
24
 A comparison of the complete employment law legislation is 
too complex to assess, whilst a comparison of individual norms is not 
practical, because norms as good as never ”stand alone”, but are embedded 
in correlating norms. Consequently, a comparison of ”norm complexes” 
should be the most practical approach.
25
 
 
What is important to point out is that the comparison of favourability even 
comprises collective agreements, as long as the employee is party of such 
or if they are universally binding.
26
 
 
d) Lex loci laboris 
In the absence of an explicit or implicit agreement, Rome I had to make a 
decision between the two generally available principles: The principle of the 
country of origin and the principle of the country in which the work takes 
place
27
. Rome I stuck to the decision of the convention form 1980, which is 
a compromised decision for the Place-of-Work-principle with exceptions.  
 
Generally, the country where the employee habitually carries out (”lex loci 
laboris”, Art. 8 II Rome I) his work applies to the substantive part of the 
employment contract.
28
. 
 
e) Employing branch 
If the ”habitual workplace” cannot be defined, according to Art. 8 III the 
place of the employing branch decides upon the applicable law.
29
 The most 
                                                 
22
 Thüsing, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht, p.371 
23
 Riesenhuber, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht, p.134; Thüsing, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht, 
p.370; Löwisch, Labor Law in Europe, p.101, 114 
24
 NZA 2010, 1380, 1381 
25
 NZA 2010, 1380, 1383 
26
 RdA 2009, 144, 149 
27
 Thüsing,Europäisches Arbeitsrecht,p.275 
28
 Nielsen, European Labour Law, p.178; Löwisch, Labor Law in Europe, p.101, 114 
29
 NZA 2010, 1380, 1383 
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important cases of this are such in which the workplace itself is moving 
(trains, airplanes, ships).
30
 
 
f) ECJ C-383/95 (Rutten, 1997), ECJ C-29/10, Koelzsch, 2011) 
There can be cases in which the ”habitual” workplace is in various 
countries, for instance a sales agent who works in Germany, Belgium and 
the Netherlands to the same extent. Opposed to a minor opinion that always 
wants to apply the law of the place of the employing branch
31
, the ECJ has 
decided that even in if an employee works in various countries, the country 
in which he mainly habitually works can and must be assessed. 
In it’s ruling ”Rutten”32, that concerned a case of enforcement law though, 
the ECJ stated that a strong indicator for the habitual place of work was the 
place where the employee organizes his work from and where he returns to. 
Recently, in its Koeltzsch-judgement33 the ECJ confirmed this jurisdiction 
with regards to the – now entered into force – Rome I. It clarified that the 
term ”habitual place of work” must – for the purpose of a strong employee 
protection – be interpreted widely.34 It was the place where the employee 
provides the major part of his work.35 The ECJ thereby opposes minor 
opinions in legal literature that suggest that a ”habitual place of work” does 
not exist in cross-border cases, for the purpose of legal certainty. The – 
admittedly easier – tie to the employing branch would be to the 
disadvantage of the employee, so that the ECJ rejected this opinion. The 
ECJ defines the ”place of habitual employment as ”the place in which or 
from which the employee performs the greater part of his obligations  
towards his employer”. Relevant indicators are where and from where the 
employee mainly fulfills his transport tasks, where he receives his 
instructions for his tasks and where he organizes his work, where the work 
instruments are situated and to which place he returns after fulfilling of his 
tasks. According to the ECJ, only if it is impossible to determine a country 
in which the employee works most habitually, the second criterion applies, 
which is the place in which the employment contract was concluded.
36
 
 
g) ECJ C‑384/10 (Voogsgeerd, 2012) 
In its recent ”Voogsgeerd”-judgement, the ECJ clarified the controversial 
interpretation of the formulation ” country where the place of business 
through which the employee was engaged is situated” in Art. 8 III Rome I. 
It completes the ECJ-jurisdiction concerning Art.8 Rome I after the 
Koeltzsch-judgement.
37
 
 
The ECJ had to deal with the question, weather the relevant place was the 
one of the formal employer according to the employment contract, or the 
                                                 
30
 RdA 2009, 144, 148 
31
 Deinert, RdA 1996, 339, 341 
32
 ECJ C-383/95 (Rutten, 1997) 
33
 ECJ C-383/95 (Rutten, 1997), Rd.45 
34
 ECJ C-383/95 (Rutten, 1997), Rd.45 
35
 ECJ C-383/95 (Rutten, 1997), Rd.45 
36
 Thüsing, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht,p.278 
37
 EuZW 2012, 139 
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one that practically directed the employee. For the first opinion speaks the 
argument of legal certainty. The danger with the first opinion is the risk of 
manipulation though, for instance a firm could install ”employment-offices” 
in a country with low employee protection for the only reason to sign the 
contract there (obviously only in cases where there is not a ”habitual 
workplace” already anyway). The ECJ follows the first opinion anyway.38 It 
argues with the wording of Art. 8 III. Furthermore, according to the 
Koeltzsch-judgement, in most cases there is a ”habitual place of work” 
anyway, so that Art. 8 III cannot use arguments of the habitual workplace to 
decide the location of the employer, and at last, if this ruling leads to misuse 
on behalf of employers, this can be corrected by the general clause of Art. 8 
IV. 
h) General clause 
Apart from the system of Art. 8 I-III, there is a general clause in Art. 8 IV. 
It statutes that – in case the general rules lead to inappropriate results, the 
law of another country can be applied if exceptional circumstances lead to 
the contract being more closely related to another state.
39
 Main cases of such 
exceptions are branch managers
40
. Also the place of residence of the 
employee can play a role, as well as a common nationality of the parties.
41
 
 
i) Art. 9 
Art. 9 Rome I correlates to the exceptions of Art. 8 I (2). Art. 8 I (2) 
decides, which domestic laws must not be applied. For example: The parties 
choose polish law for a contract that is exercised habitually in Germany. 
That means that polish law is the governing law, but a polish court must not 
apply a polish provision that is disadvantageous compared to an 
indispensible German provision in the sense of Art. 8 I (2). Art. 9 is the 
”active” counternorm of Art. 8 I (2). It ensures that the responsible court can 
apply the norms that it considers ”indispositive” due to a public interest, 
even if actually, according to Art. 8, the law of another country would be 
applicable.
42
 
 
j) Indispositive laws 
The evaluation which laws are indispositive is up to national courts of the 
country in which the norm in question is in force to ascertain, e.g. the 
Federal Labour Court in Germany has declared laws on mass dismissals, 
dismissal protection of work councils,  protection of mothers and disabled 
persons, and the posted workers law, as well as laws on antidiscrimination 
as unconditionally applicable. It has rejected the indispensible character of 
basic dismissal protection or continuation of payments to sick workers. 
 
                                                 
38
 ECJ C‑384/10 
39
 NZA 2010, 1380, 1384 
40
 RdA 2009, 144, 147 
41
 RdA 2009, 144, 147 
42
 Thüsing, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht, p.373, BAG 5 AZR 255/00 12.12.2001 (German 
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k) Wide scope of Art. 8 
Despite the fact that the scope of Rome I is, according to Art. 1, only private 
law, according to the wording of Art.8 Rome I with regards to employment 
contracts it covers all employment-related laws, not only such from 
contract law. 
 
6.2 Directive on services in the internal market 
2006/123 
In 2006 the Directive on services in the internal market
43
 was enforced. It 
regulates the applicable jurisdiction for cross-border services, similar to 
”Rome I”. ”Rome I” is a ”lex specialis”, though, because Art. 1 VI DS 
excludes labour law from the scope of its application. Nevertheless, this 
exclusion causes problems, because there is no common european 
differentiation between ”services” and ”labour contracts”, so that the 
differentiation must be assessed by the national courts where the specific 
action takes place.
44
 The main difference in the national jurisdiction 
regarding this question is the treatment of ”fake-independence”, officially 
independent workers, that in practice depend on one ”employer”. Since the 
treatment of such is up to national courts to ascertain, in each case the 
national jurisdiction of the country in question must be assessed to find out 
weather the case is subject to ”Rome I” or not. 
6.3 The relationship between EU labour law and 
domestic labour law 
Several EU regulations, Directives and the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union include regulations with regards to employment 
relationships. 
 
Regulations are generally directly applicable, Directives are only in 
exceptions directly applicable if certain conditions are met (more on that 
later). In case of the TFEU it depends on ECJ jurisdiction, weather a certain 
provision is directly effective or not.  The ECJ has ruled with regards to 
many EU labour law provisions that they are directly effective. For example 
Article 18 TFEU (general ban of discriminations on grounds of nationality), 
Article 45 (free movement of workers) and Article 157 TFEU (gender 
equality) are directly effective.
45
 
With the special phenomenon of ”horizontal direct effect”, I will deal later 
on when it becomes relevant. 
 
In other judgements the ECJ has ruled, though, that certain provisions of EU 
law are not directly effective, for instance Article 151 TFEU.
46
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44
 NZA 2011, 258, 258 
45
 Nielsen, European Labour Law, p.58 
46
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We can conclude that with regards to European Legal provisions that relate 
to employment relationships, the direct applicability must be assessed in 
each case concerning the respective provision. 
 
6.4 Jurisdiction 
The question, which jurisdiction is competent to decide employment related 
cases, is answered by the Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I, also ”EuGVO”), 
which is in force since 1.3.2002. For the EFTA-states (Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland, but not Liechtenstein) the ”Lugano-convention” from 
30.10.2007 regulates literally the same as Brussels I with regards to 
employment contracts. 
 
Generally, if a domestic court is competent according to domestic procedure 
law, it remains responsible in international cases
47
, unless superior law, such 
as Brussels I, regulates something altering. 
 
A company domiciled in one EU state may also be sued in another EU 
country in which it maintains a branch office from which the dispute arouse 
(Art. 5 V). For employment contracts, there are special additional provisions 
in Art. 18-21. Employers can additionally to the described standard rules be 
sued at the place where the employee usually carries or carried out his or her 
work” or ”where the business which engaged the employee is or was 
situated” (Art.19).48 Thus, Brussels I provides several places of jurisdiction 
for the claimant. 
 
Files of the employer against the employee must take place in the usual 
place of residence of the employee (Art. 19).
49
 
 
Derivations from Brussels I based on foreign law, e.g. agreements on 
jurisdiction in a collective agreement, are void.
50
 
 
Concerning employers from Non-Member-States, Brussels I is applicable, if 
they have a branch in a Member State.
51
 
 
For non-contractual arguments (e.g. a claim of an employer against a labour 
union concerning a strike), Rome-II regulates the jurisdiction.
52
 Due to the 
smaller significance, details will be blend out here. 
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52
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6.5 Interim result 
So far, we can conclude that 
 Firstly it must be assessed which domestic law generally governs the 
employment contract, which is done by an assessment of Rome I. 
 Secondly, if and which foreign laws exceptionally can be applied to 
the worker anyway, and 
 Thirdly, which courts are responsible to decide upon the matter. 
 17 
7 Posting of workers 
The first situation of cross-border employment is the posting of workers. 
That means that workers who are employed in one state, are temporarily 
send abroad to work in another state. 
 
These situations are regulated by the respective domestic implementations 
of the european ”Posting of Workers Directive”53 (96/71). In the following, 
the directive will be introduced and problems that have been dealt with by 
the ECJ so far will be discussed. 
7.1 Legal protection of the home country 
In the absence of european legislation, only a few Member States have 
explicit laws that protect workers from their home countries when they are 
posted abroad, such as Ireland, Lithuania and Portugal. Such rights are 
mainly information rights. Due to a lack of a european level and the 
practical insignificants, this topic is, in my opinion, dealt with sufficiently 
by this short notice. All problems in the field of posted workers derive from 
the treatment of posted workers by the host countries, as follows. 
7.2 Introduction to the PWD 
Employers from member states with cheap labour and weak employee 
protection laws can send workers abroad temporarily. 
 
The term ”temporarily” is a subjective one, deciding is the will of the parties 
that the employee will return (”animus retrahendi”). Only a few54 national 
implementations of the Directive have set time limits
55
. In most (but not all) 
member states, the period of posting has no static time limit.
56
 
 
In order to understand the PWD, it is necessary to see where it comes from. 
Originally, the situation of posted workers was dealt with by the Rome-
Regulation of 1980, which is for employees – as said – very similar to Rome 
I. Today, the system of Rome I could have been the only law solving the 
situation of posted workers. Compared to other cross-border situations, 
though, there is a signifiant difference to posted workers. The latter go 
abroad temporarily, which means they never have the intention to become 
subject of another legislation in the first place.
57
 Furthermore, the posting of 
workers is way more common than the situation that a worker is 
permanently working in another country than where his employment 
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55
 Riesenhuber, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht, p.131; Drummonds, Global employment law for 
the practicing lawyer,  p.14 
56
 Thematic Report 2008: Challenges of Cross-Border mobility, p.8 
57
 Thüsing,Europäisches Arbeitsrecht,p.278; Riesenhuber, Europäisches Arbeitsrecht, 
p.131; Drummonds, Global employment law for the practicing lawyer,  p.14 
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contract was signed. Therefore, the PWD can be seen as a special regulation 
that regulates the situation of posted workers in greater detail than Rome I. 
Whilst the general valuations remain the same (the intention to protect a 
worker), the fundamental difference between Rome I and the PWD – as a 
consequence of the ”temporary” character of the posting - is that the place-
of-work-principle is generally substituted by the place-of-origin-
principle. 
 
Due to the European freedom to provide services, the destination country 
cannot prohibit the posting of workers. Thereby originates the risk that 
employment protection is circumvented by employment contracts governed 
by countries in which labour is cheap, whilst workers are regularly 
temporarily sent abroad to work there.
58
 This risk of the uncompromised 
principle of state of origin ought to be balanced out by the European Posting 
of Workers Directive
59
 (96/71) enacted in 1996.
60
 It was implemented in the 
member states, for example in Germany by the Posting of Workers Act 
(„Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz“). Its method is to replace the general 
principle of place of origin partly by the place of work principle (”territorial 
approach”61) concerning ”hardcore” employee protection laws.62 
 
According to Art. 1 III of the PWD, it covers three situations: 
 The posting of workers to a customer due to contract for services or 
work and services  
 The posting of workers to an establishment or undertaking owned by 
a group 
 The lease of workers cross-border. 
In all situations, there must be an employment relationship between the 
undertaking making the posting and the worker.
63
 
7.3 Indispensible national laws 
What would – without the PWD – be subject of jurisdiction with regards to 
Art.9 Rome I, namely a list of indispensible domestic laws that must not be 
derogated from even by the general applicability of a foreign legislation, is 
laid down as a catalogue in Art. 3 of the PWD.
64
  The list comprises: 
 No.1: Minimum wage laws 
 No.2: Minimum vacation and paid vacation 
 No.3: Working time 
 No.4: Leasing of workers 
 No.5: Employment protection laws 
 No.6: Protection of youth and mothers 
 No.7: Anti-discrimination laws 
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This list is not exclusive. For example, according to the German Federal 
Labour Court, the necessity of the integration agency before dismissals of 
disabled employees, rules on mass dismissals, or ongoing payments during 
sicknesses are indispensible laws, whilst basic dismissal protection or a 
limited liability of employees in tort law were seen as indispensible.
65
 
 
For example, a Japanese worker carrying out work in a German branch will 
be entitled to the minimum vacation of 24 working days according to the 
German Federal Vacation Act (Bundesurlaubsgesetz), although Japanese 
employment contract law applies.
66
 
 
With regards to the assessment of indispensible laws, it must be taken care 
that ”Rome I” and the ”PWD” are not mixed up. As said before, there is 
jurisdiction on which laws are indispensible according to Art. 9 Rom I, as 
well as jurisdiction on the domestic implementations of Art. 3 PWD. Even 
though there is no binding necessity that both line of judgements would be 
valid even for the other provision, since – as said – the basic valuations 
behind ”Rome I” and the ”PWD” are the same and, before the PWD, the 
predecessor of ”Rome I” governed posted workers as well, it can be 
assumed that if a court considers a norm ”indispensible” with regards to 
Rome I, it is probably also indispensible with regards to the PWD, and vice 
versa. 
 
7.4 Other problems and concretions of the PWD 
a) No minimum protection 
It is important to point out that the Directive does not set any standards of 
minimum protection, it only circumscribes the areas in which domestic laws 
must be applied.
67
 
 
b) Lack of definitions 
A problem of the PWD is a lack of definitions, namely of ”workers” and 
”posted” workers. 
In the absence of a european definition, the jurisdiction of the receiving 
states are to define the term ”worker”.68 The biggest difference concerning 
the definition of ”workers” are cases of ”fake independence” (”One-man-
companies” that factually depend on one company, which is – in some 
Member States – the ”employer” anyhow).69 
Also the definition of the term ”posted worker” can vary amongst the 
Member States.
70
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c) Collective Agreements 
A special problem are collective agreements. They might regulate issues 
that fall into one of the seven categories of the PWD, for example collective 
agreements often regulate the working time. In such a case, collective 
agreements do not necessarily apply according to the respective 
implementations of the PWD, because they are no ”laws”.71 
 
Then again, many member states have a system in which (under different 
conditions) collective agreements can be declared universally applicable
72
 
and consequently included universally binding collective agreements in 
their domestic implementations of the PWD
73
 
 
Opposed to a minor opinion in legal literature
74
 that claims that even 
universally applicable collective agreements are agreements and not laws, 
the ECJ rightfully accepts universally applicable collective agreements as 
laws that fall within the scope of the PWD.
75
 That is justified, because 
universally applicable collective agreements function like laws and ”tariff 
autonomy” is even mentioned in Art.1 (2) PWD. 
 
d) ”Nordic Model” 
In Denmark and Sweden, the ”Nordic Model” exists, which means that 
instead of a universal applicability of collective agreements, the application 
of collective agreements is brought about by means of industrial action.
76
 
That means that in these countries, collective agreements do not fall under 
the scope of the PWD, which became a problem in the ”Laval”-case (see 
later). 
 
e) Fundamental freedoms 
Immense problems have been caused by the relationship between the PWD 
and european fundamental economic freedoms. Therefore, in the following, 
these freedoms will be introduced and the core-judgements of the ECJ with 
regards to the PWD, afterwards I will get back to the PWD and 
consequences from the judgements. 
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8 History of jurisdiction with 
regards to the Posting of 
Workers 
The ECJ has dealt with the posting of workers in several judgements. Most 
of them were related to the freedom to provide services, which is why I will 
introduce essentials of this freedom shortly first. 
8.1 Freedom to provide services 
The freedom to provide services will only be summed up to the extent that it 
is relevant for labour law here. Mainly it is relevant for the posting of 
workers and for temporary workers (workers that are „lend out“ from the 
employee to temporarily work for another company).
77
 
 
Services are performances that are regularly provided for remuneration, in 
so far as they are not covered by the freedom of goods and capital.
78
 
Forbidden are discriminations and restrictions.
79
 The freedom to provide 
services binds, according to the ECJ, besides the member states also privates 
to the extent that they have a collective power of regulation.
80
 
 
A restriction is, for instance, if a member state applies national employee 
protection laws even to employers that have an employment contract 
governed by a foreign member state, but that are sent abroad temporarily 
to work.
81
 This restriction must be justified, then. More about that later.
82
 
 
Discriminations of the freedom to provide services can be justified only by 
the „ordre-public“- exception in Art.56 TFEU.83 Restrictions can also be 
justified by compelling reasons in the general interest („Cassis-formula“84). 
Also, all justifications must be proportionate.
85
 
 
The ECJ has accepted the protection of workers as a „compelling reasons 
in the general interest“ in the mentioned sense.86 That means the 
imposition of national employee protection laws on foreign workers is 
generally possible, but its legality must be assessed in every individual 
case.
87
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8.2 Horizontal direct effect 
In the Laval-case, the ECJ ruled that Art. 56 TFEU is applicable to trade 
unions as well.
88
 
8.3 Jurisdiction 
a) ECJ C-113/89 (Rush Portuguesa, 1990); ECJ C-43/93 (Vander 
Elst, 1994) 
In ”Rush Portuguesa”, after Portugal has become a member of the EU, a 
portuguese construction company has sent workers to France, to work on a 
site there. A french court asked the ECJ, wheather it was an accordance with 
the freedom of services to demand an employment permit from portuguese 
workers in France.
89
 The ECJ has stated that the demand of a french permit 
from foreign workers discriminates foreign service providers 
unproportionally.
90
 Thereby the ECJ made clear that, in case of voluntary 
temporary work abroad, the labour laws of the receiving country were 
generally not applicable, because the employee never intended to become 
subject to foreign employment laws.
91
 This ascertainment was the historical 
precondition of the necessity of the ”PWD”, because it was necessary to 
make exemptions from the general ”place of origin”-principle. It was 
repeated in ”Vander Elst”92, this time with regards to workers from third 
countries outside of the EU. The reasoning of the ECJ also made the 
difference between posted and leased workers clear: Because leased workers 
intend to become subject to foreign laws, they intend to make themselves 
subject to the directive rights of the hirer.
93
 Posted workers do not, so that 
they can not rely on the freedom of movement for workers.
94
 
 
b) ECJ C-369/96 (Guiot, 1999)  
In this case, the ECJ decided that in case of a posting of a worker from 
Luxemburg to Belgium, the employer must not be forced to pay social 
security fees in Belgium. The posted worker does not benefit from social 
security in Belgium, so that the obligation to pay contributions – which is a 
restriction of the freedom of services - cannot be justified with the 
protection of workers.
95
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c) ECJ C-369/96, (Arblade, 1999) 
In ”Arblade”, a french construction company was fined in Belgium, because 
they did not pay their posted workers in Belgium the minimum wages for 
workers mandatory according to belgium law. The ECJ stated that the 
application of belgian law restricts the freedom of services (Art. 56 TFEU), 
but the protection of employees as a public interest can justify this 
restriction. This judgement was necessary, even though minimum wages are 
an explicit exception laid down in Art. 3 PWD, because the TFEU – being 
primary EU law – is superior to the PWD, so the PWD could not have 
justified a breach of the freedom of services, in case there had been one. 
The ECJ stated for the first time that the imposition of domestic minimum 
wage laws onto posted workers from abroad do restrict, but not generally 
breach the freedom of service of the employer.
96
 
 
d) ECJ C-165/98  (Mazzoleni/Guillaume, 2001) 
The ECJ sets a first limit to the enforcement of domestic minimum wage 
laws on foreign posted workers. In this case, the lower wages in the home 
country were balanced out by advantages of lower taxes and social security 
fees at home. Consequently, the ECJ argued that an application of domestic 
minimum wage laws would not only balance out the disadvantages of the 
foreigner, but actually favour foreign workers, which exceeds the purpose of 
the PWD. Therefore, the restriction of the freedom of services of the 
employer was not necessary. As said, a breach of the freedom of services 
cannot be justified by the PWD, since primary law overrules secondary 
laws.
97
 
 
e) ECJ C-49/98 (Finalarte, 2001) 
In ”Finalarte”, a portuguese construction company that posted workers to a 
site in Germany, was supposed to pay fees to the German vacation fund for 
construction workers (according to a universally binding collective 
agreement), and grant the workers the minimum vacation days that the 
German law foresees. The purpose of this fund is to make sure that 
construction workers can have their annual minimum vacation despite the 
fact that in the contruction branch, a change of employer happens quite 
frequently. The problem was that a German employer can demand its paid 
fees back under given circumstances, which a foreign company cannot, 
German law grants this right only the posted worker itself. 
 
The first question could – quite easily – be answered: The granting of 
minimum vacation to posted workers was a justified restriction of the 
freedom of services, because it served the protection of workers. The 
condition is, though, that it is assessed weather the worker can have the 
demanded minimum vacation in his home country anyway – which was in 
Portugal not the case.
98
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More complicated to answer was the second question. Also here the ECJ 
stated, though, that such a provision can be lega, because the German 
administration cannot control if the foreign employer will in fact pay the 
money that the posted worker can claim from the insurancy fund according 
to German law, therefore even this restriction of the freedom of services can 
be justified for the purpose of the protection of workers.
99
  
 
f) ECJ C-164/99, (Portugaia Construções, 2002) 
In ”Portugaia Construções” there was a German universally binding 
collective agreement, which was supposed to be applied to foreign workers. 
The problem was, that German companies had the option to negotiate ”firm 
collective agreements” with lower minimum wages and thereby circumvent 
the collective agreement. This opportunity obviously does not exist for 
foreign employers.
100
 First, the ECJ restated the obvious, which is that the 
application of minimum wage laws restrict the freedom of services and this 
restriction can be justified by the protection of workers. In this case, though, 
the restriction could not be justified, because it was discriminatory against 
foreign companies.
101
 
 
g) ECJ C-341/05 (Laval, 2008) 
The most controversial case with regards to the posting of workers so far 
has been the ”Laval”-case from 2008. 
 
Facts: Laval 
In the „Laval“ case, there was a latvian building company („Laval“) that has 
sent workers to Sweden for roughly half a year to build a school premise for 
its swedish subsidiary company.
102
 Laval was not bound by collective 
agreements in Sweden, since negotiations with the responsible swedish 
labour union („Byggettan“) failed.103 Consequently, Byggetan initiated a  
blockade of the construction site. Laval demanded the swedish police to 
stop the blockade, that request was rejected because the police considered 
the blockade legal according to swedish law. 
 
Applicability / Scope 
In ”Laval” the ECJ stated that the collective action is 
 „...liable to make it less attractive, or more difficult, for such 
undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden, and 
therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services 
within the meaning of Article 49 EC.“104 
Concludentally, collective actions can restrict the freedom to provide 
services. 
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Justification: Service (Laval) 
The main problem of the judgment was to assess whether the collective 
action at issue was in accordance with the freedom of service.
105
 
The right to take collective action against social dumping may constitute 
an overriding reason of public interest which can, in principle, justify a 
restriction of „one of the fundamental freedoms“ guaranteed by the treaty“. 
It must be kept in mind that the EU has „not only an economic, but also a 
social purpose“106 In this case, the purpose of the collective actions was the 
protection of workers.
107
 It must in each case be assessed what the purpose 
of the collective action is, even though it lies in the nature of labor unions 
that the protection of workers will be the usual goal. 
EU law does not prohibit Member States from requiring such undertakings 
to comply with their rules on minimum pay by appropriate means
108
, as the 
PWD and past ECJ jurisdiction had made clear. In this case, the protection 
of workers cannot outweigh the freedom to provide services, because the 
Swedish legislation was not clear enough to determine the obligations 
arising from Swedish law for foreign undertakings. That is because of the 
“Nordic Model” of imposing minimum wages only by collective agreements 
and, if necessary, collective actions, instead of e.g. universally binding 
collective agreements. 
 „...where the negotiations on pay, which that action seeks to require 
an undertaking established in another Member State to enter into, 
form part of a national context characterized by a lack of 
provisions, of any kind, which are sufficiently precise and accessible 
that they do not render it impossible or excessively difficult in 
practice for such an undertaking to determine the obligations with 
which it is required to comply as regards minimum pay (see, to that 
effect, Arblade and Others, § 43).“109 
Furthermore, the strike took place without the participation of the 
employees of Laval. None of the workers was member of the swedish 
albour union or partook in the strike.
110
 Goal of the Union was not the 
representation of these workers, but forcing Laval to replace the Latvian 
collective agreement with Swedish minimum wages for the purpose of – 
indirectly – protecting Swedish employees from ”loan dumping”.111 
Therefore, the case was subject to the Posted Workers Directive and more 
than what the Directive regulates can a member state not impose.
112
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The Laval-ruling was criticized, because the EU has no legislative 
competence in the field of strikes, nevertheless the ECJ defines in detail 
how the right to strike must be applied.
113
 This critique is wrong, thouch: 
The ECJ can apply the economic freedoms as borders of domestic 
legislation in all fields, regardless if there is a legislative competence, 
because the economic freedoms are hierarchically above basic national laws. 
Consequences of Laval 
Since the collective action taken was illegal according to the ECJ, the 
swedish government started to initiated legislative reforms with the goal to 
regulate in written law the applicability of domestic minimum wages on 
posted workers from abroad.
114
 
 
ECJ C-426/11 (Parkwood Leisure) 
Recently, the ECJ issued the ruling in the Case ”Alemon-Herron / Parkwood 
Leisure Ltd”115. In this case, there was an english private company, 
Parkwood Leisure, who had taken over a business to which a public 
collective agreement was applicable. After the takeover the parties of the 
collective agreement renegotiated this agreement backdatedly and 
”dynamically” referred to all undertakings that were by that date subject to 
the collective agreement. 
 
In the preceding judgement ”Werhof”116 in 2006 the ECJ stated that, if a 
company that is by contract bound to a specific collective agreement, the 
buyer of this business is, after a transfer of undertakings, only bound to the 
agreement in the shape in which it was on the day of the transfer. 
Renegotiations after the takeover do not have to be considered buy the 
overtaking company. That means that it is legal, if the domestic laws follow 
a ”static” approach on the binding effect of collective agreements in case of 
takeovers. 
 
In ”Parkwood Leisure” the ECJ had to decide on the opposite situation: 
Domestic laws followed a ”dynamic” approach, meaning that buyers were 
supposed to be bound by collective agreements, even if they were changed 
aftter the takeover had taken place. Such a domestic law is, according to the 
ECJ, illegal and thereby void. 
 
Both judgements do not have a specific relevance for cross-border 
situations. Nevertheless, they are relevant for situations as in the ”Laval”-
case, because it adds on to the limitation of the power of labour unions by 
the ECJ. The consequence of ”Parkwood Leisure” is that with every transfer 
of an undertaking, employees lose their protection by collective agreements 
on the day the current collective agreement expires, unless a completely new 
one is negotiated. That is an enormous risk for all those countries, in which 
currently a ”dynamic” approach had applied so far, even more so if 
                                                 
113
 Blanke, Die Entscheidungen des EuGH in den Fällen Viking, Laval und Rueffert, p.13 
114
 Rönmar, Laval returns to Sweden,  284 
115
 ECJ 18.7.2013, C-426/11 (Parkwood Leisure) 
116
 ECJ 9.3.2006 - C 499/04 (Werhof) 
 27 
collective agreements have a major relevance, such as – as stated above – 
Scandinavia. Obviously, collective actions will from now on also be illegal, 
if it aims at the enforcement of rights deriving from a collective agreement 
that is now inapplicable. Basically, if countries with a dynamic approach 
want to ensure to keep up their level of protection, the tendency should go 
towards the usage of ”declarations of universal applicability” (as possible in 
Germany, but not Sweden), or to regulate the rights that are considered most 
crucial (in Sweden that might be minimum wages) as laws and not only by 
collective agreements, to prevent a circumvention of such rights by transfers 
of overtakings. 
 
h) ECJ C-346/06 (Rüffert, 2008) 
”Rüffert”117 was a case that dealt with the habit of states to ensure 
complience with standards of tariffs of collective agreements by contractual 
obligations. In Germany there were two levels of collective agreement 
which applied to the construction industry. The construction industry as a 
whole was governed by a collective agreement providing a minimum wage 
(referred to as the TV Mindestlohn). This was clearly within Art. 3(1)(c) 
PWD. However, there were also a series of specific collective agreements 
(such as the Buildings and public works collective agreement at issue in the 
case) with limited territorial scope and which set wages which were well 
above those required throughout Germany under the TV Mindeslohn. The 
question was whether it was legitimate to contractually require compliance 
with a local collective agreement guaranteeing higher wages.  
 
The ECJ stated that this habit was a breach of the freedom of services.
118
 
Opposed to the Advocate General, it stated that Art. 3 (VII) PWD could not 
be interpreted as allowing the host Member State to make the provision of 
services in its territory conditional on the observance of terms and 
conditions of employment which go beyond the mandatory rules for 
minimum protection. Only ”legal” obligations were qualified to justify the 
restriction of the freedom of services.
119
 Binding foreign construction 
companies to domestic collective agreement standards is not a legal mean to 
ensure social standards of workers. The latter aim must only be achieved 
within the borders of the PWD.
120
 The practice of Lower Saxony remains 
legal, though, with regards to employers from third countries outside of the 
EU.
121
 
 
i) C-319/06 (Commission v. Luxemburg, 2008) 
Luxemburg had legally explicitly provided that all its employment rights in 
certain areas (e.g. minimum wage laws) were mandatory rules within the 
meaning of Art. 9 (2) Rome I. These areas encompassed rules that went 
beyond the matters listed in Art. 3 I PWD. As Laval and Rüffert have 
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shown, such provision are a breach of the PWD. Luxemburg argued, 
though, that Art. 3 X PWD allowed its provisions, as they were such of 
public policy. The ECJ interpreted Art. 3 X PWD in the way that ”public 
policy” provisions are only such which are crucial for the protection of the 
political, social or economic order in the Member State. The exception of 
Art. 3 X must be understood in a narrow sense and in particular its scope 
cannot be decidid by the Member State itself, but be controlled, otherwise 
Art. 3 X would be a mean of circumvention Art.3 to derogate from the 
PWD.
122
 Luxmeburg had not proven that and why the provisions should be 
such crucial for its public policy, therefore it lost the case. 
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9 Freedom ot establishment 
The scope of the freedom of establishment comprises the establishment of 
independent persons. As the freedom to provide services, it binds the state 
as well as privates, to the extent that they apply collective regulative 
power.
123
 It prohibits discriminations as well as restrictions.
124
 Also the 
justification works in accordance to the freedom to provide services: 
Discriminations can only be justified by the „ordre-public“- exception in 
Art.49 TFEU.
125
 Restrictions can also be justified by compelling reasons in 
the general interest („Cassis-formula“126). The main relevance of the 
freedom of establishment with regards to labour law is its effect on 
Company Codetermination and collective actions
127
, the most important 
judgement with regards to the latter was the ”Viking-Line”-case128. 
 
9.1 ECJ C-438/05 (Viking Line, 2007) 
a) Facts 
Viking Line is a transportation company with seat in Finnland. It operated a 
ship between Helsinki/Finnland and Tallinn/Estonia.
129
 Since an estonian 
competitor operated more profitable, because it had to pay lower wages, 
Viking Line decided to register its ship in Tallinn instead of Helsinki, for 
the purpose of making estonian laws applicable on the ship and thereby 
making labour cheaper.
130
 The Finnish Seamens Union (FSU) planned 
industrial actions against this reflagging and the International Transport 
Workers Federation (ITWF) told all its domestic partners not to negotiate 
with Viking Line and hinder its business. The ECJ had to decide weather 
these collective actions were justified or if national authorities (in that case 
England, because the ITWF headquater was in London) was obliged to 
prevent the actions in question of FSU and ITWF.
131
 
 
b) Horizontal Direct Effect 
As it was published before the ”Laval”-jurisdiction (which copied the 
argumentation on the ”horizontal direct effect” from ”Viking Line”), the 
ECJ dealt with the question, to which extent the freedom of establishment 
has horizontal direct effect. 
The ECJ stated that 
 „...the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of 
movement for persons and freedom to provide services would be 
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compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralized by 
obstacles resulting from the exercise, by associations or organizations not 
governed by public law, of their legal autonomy...It follows that Article 43 
EC must be interpreted as meaning that...it may be relied on by a private 
undertaking against a trade union or an association of trade unions.“ 
and 
 „collective action such as that described in the first question referred by 
the national court falls, in principle, within the scope of Article 43 EC.“132 
 
It is thereby clear that the freedom of establishment binds trade unions and 
trade union organizations. It is not clear, though, how far the horizontal 
effect goes concerning other actors in employment law. 
 
There are arguments for a broad interpretation of the freedom of service, 
some of which can be concluded from the judgement of the ECJ. Firstly the 
wording of the court is „actions by individuals“. This might imply that the 
ECJ means all individuals, because it could have said „actions by labour 
unions“ instead, but did not.133 Secondly, privates can have as much power 
as the state, for instance when they are given exclusive control over a 
specific regulatory area, like sports (Bosman-ruling
134
).
135
 
 
On the other hand, there are arguments for a narrow interpretation of the 
freedom of service, meaning that – apart from the state - only labour unions 
are bound by it, because of their „state-like“ quasi-legislative power. Firstly, 
labour unions or labour union organizations can be, and are in most member 
states, quite powerful organizations that can negotiate agreements that have 
normative effect. It can be seen so that such Unions are, in practice, more 
„like the state“ and just „formally“ privates. Hereby it can be argued that the 
broadening of the scope of the freedom of service to labour unions is a 
special, narrow exception due to the specialities of labour law.
136
 Secondly, 
a broadening of the interpretation would lead to even less legal certainty.
137
 
Because it could be argued that for instance work councils have much 
regulatory power, or firms in themselves, or loose coalitions of customers, 
or landowners
138
...as soon as the debate about the width of the horizontal 
effect is furthermore generalized, legal uncertainty will be the 
consequence.
139
 Therefore, trade unions should remain the one rare 
exception for horizontal effect due to the specialities of labour laws. 
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c) Scope 
The court shortly concludes that the registration of a vessel is the exercise of 
the freedom of establishment.
140
 This question is a speciality of the case 
without any relevance for labour law, so it will not be analysed here. The 
ECJ concluded in ”Viking Line” that a collective action of the FSU has 
 „...the effect of making less attractive, or even pointless, ... Viking’s 
exercise of its right to freedom of establishment, inasmuch as such 
action prevents both Viking and its subsidiary, Viking Eesti, from 
enjoying the same treatment in the host Member State as other 
economic operators established in that State.
 141
 
The same is valid for collective actions of the ITF.
142
 Consequently, both 
collective actions restrict the freedom of establishment.
143
 
 
d) Discussed exeptions 
Several possible exceptions from the scope of the freedom of establishment 
have been discussed and rejected by the ECJ. 
Strikes 
The ECJ rejected
144
 arguments of the Danish government that argued for a 
limitation of the scope of the freedom of establishment with regards to the 
 right of association 
 right to strike 
 right to impose lock-outs 
Generally formulated, the question was weather rights that are transferred 
by domestic laws in areas where the Union does not have legislative 
competences must be excluded from the scope of the freedom of 
establishment. The ECJ held that
145
 
  „...the answer to the first question must be that Article 43 EC is to 
be interpreted as meaning that, in principle, collective action 
initiated by a trade union or a group of trade unions against an 
undertaking in order to induce that undertaking to enter into a 
collective agreement, the terms of which are liable to deter it from 
exercising freedom of establishment, is not excluded from the scope 
of that article.
146
 
The rejection of this argument was to be expected and is quite obvious, 
because – as the ECJ has stated147 – by applying the freedom of 
establishment to cases with regards to rights transferred by domestic laws, 
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the Union does not enact laws in a field it has no competence in. The fields 
brought forth by the Danish government can be fully governed by the 
national legislative powers without any interference from the EU. 
Nevertheless, in all fields in which national parliaments have the full 
legislative competence, the application of such must comply with 
community law.
148
 
 
Exceptions for fundamental rights 
Moreover, the swedish and danish governments argued that the right to 
strike was a fundamental right and must therefore be excluded from the 
scope of the freedom of establishment.
149
 This point of view was also, 
rightfully, rejected by the ECJ: 
 „...the right to take collective action, including the right to strike, 
must ... be recognized as a fundamental right which forms an 
integral part of the general principles of Community law the 
observance of which the Court ensures, the exercise of that right 
may none the less be subject to certain restrictions. As is reaffirmed 
by Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, those rights are to be protected in accordance with 
Community law and national law and practices.“150 
This ruling is logical and consequent, as it is in accordance with previous 
jurisdiction. Namely in the cases „Schmidberger“151 and „Omega“152 
the Court held that the protection of fundamental rights can be a 
legitimate interest that justifies the restriction of obligations deriving 
from community law (in those cases concerning the free movement of 
goods, respectively the freedom to provide services), but does not 
restrict the scope of application of such.
153
 
 
Later in Laval, the ECJ confirmed this jurisdiction with concern of the 
freedom of service.
154
 
 
Albany judgement analogous 
The court had to decide as well if the freedom of establishment must be 
restricted, analogous to the „Albany“-judgment155 with regards to collective 
actions in collective negotiations. In „Albany“ the ECJ stated that 
agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations between 
management and labor must fall outside the scope of Art. 85 (I) of the 
Treaty, because there was no way to reconcile a pension fund, set up by the 
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social partners, with EU competition law.
156
 This reasoning cannot be 
applied analogous to the economic freedoms in Title III of the treaty, 
though.
157
 Firstly, it is not inherent in the exercise of collective actions that 
such necessarily affect fundamental freedoms.
158
 Secondly the provisions 
on competition in the treaty have another goal, which is mainly the 
unification and liberalization of the market, whilst the economic freedoms 
aim to transfer individual rights, thereby the provisions must not necessarily 
have correlating scopes.
159
 
e) Justification of the restrictions 
After neglecting all restrictions, the ECJ had to deal with the possibility to 
justify the restriction of the freedom of establishment. The public interest 
must not only be overriding the restriction, but the mean must also be 
suitable and the least restrictive mean.
160
 
With regards to the necessity of the collective action, it depends on the 
possibilities that national laws give trade unions, weather there would 
have been alternative, less restrictive means to achieve the own goal and to 
which extent the trade union had exhausted them before initiating the action 
in question.
161
 
In the proportionality test, the ECJ points out the importance of the 
economic freedoms as „fundamental economic freedom rights“.162 
 
It furthermore decides that the right to strike itself, even as an acknowledged  
fundamental right, is not enough to justify a restriction of an economic 
freedom, instead the purpose of the strike must be taken into 
consideration.
163
 
 
The purpose of the strike that was argued for was the protection of 
workers.
164
 In general, this can be an overriding legitimate interest, 
according to the ECJ.
165
 On the other hand, not every action that aims at the 
protection of workers is an overriding mean. It must be analyzed, under 
which circumstances which value overweighs. 
 
For the importance of the protection of workers speaks that the EU has not 
only the goal to abolish obstacles of the common market, but also a „policy 
in the social sphere“.166 
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The ECJ furthermore states that it should be 
 „...borne in mind that it is common ground that collective action, 
like collective negotiations and collective agreements, may, in the 
particular circumstances of a case, be one of the main ways in 
which trade unions protect the interests of their members“ 167 
 
On the other hand, the ECJ clearly states two conditions of proportionality 
that restrict the freedom of the Union: 
 
Firstly, if the jobs or conditions of employment were not seriously 
jeopardized without the collective action, the freedom of establishment 
should always overweigh.
168
 
 
Also, in case ship-owners are, as a consequence of the collective action, 
fully prevented from registering their vessels in another member state, the 
restriction of the freedom of establishment cannot be justified.
169
 It can be 
abstracted from that for general judgments that an absolute prevention of 
the exercise of the freedom of establishment cannot be justified with the 
purpose of the protection of workers. If this conclusion can analogously be 
applied to other economic freedoms, must be evaluated in the future. 
 
The ECJ comes to the conclusion, that – even though it is up to national 
courts to ascertain, to which extent collective actions protect workers and 
consequently if this protection is more important than the freedom of 
establishment
170
, in this case the arguments of the Union weigh little. 
 
f) Critique 
About the judgment is criticized that the ECJ considered the right to strike 
as a right that is „below“ the economic freedoms, by saying that the right to 
strike needs profound arguments to restrict the economic freedom – and not 
vice versa. This critique is not justified, though: The right to strike is a 
„fundamental freedom“, and those are – in line with constant jurisdiction of 
the ECJ – typically „public interests“ that can justify the restriction of 
economic freedoms. 
 
What is actually critical about the judgment of the ECJ is, first of all, that 
the judgment does not provide a deep clarity about the system and values of 
the relevant criteria. 
 
Substantially, the court oversees that the core purpose of collective actions 
is the restriction of economic freedom, because precisely the restriction of 
economic freedom is what makes strikes effective. That means there can 
necessarily not be a „less restrictive mean“ to achieve the goal, the intensity 
of the restriction and the effectivity of the mean stand in a necessarily 
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congruent relation, so the „intensity“ of the strike should logically not have 
been taken into consideration, in my opinion. 
 
9.2 Problem of Company Codetermination 
National companies are founded by the law of one member state. Which law 
applies to them is determined by international corporate law.
171
 National 
laws have two different solutions to decide upon the applicable law: The 
incorporation theory and the real seat theory.
172
 Despite the fact that this 
particular problem of corporate law is not subject to this analysis, the 
question which law governs the corporation can affect labour law anyway 
with regards to company codetermination, because the applicable law for 
company codetermination derives from the applicable law on the 
corporation contract.
173
 
 
First, the company that was founded in a member state „brings“ the 
company codetermination law of its home country with it if it replaces its 
seat to another state.
174
 
 
The receiving member state can, due to the freedom of establishment, not 
keep a foreign company from replacing its seat.
175
 If the receiving member 
state wants to prevent the risk that national employee protection is 
circumvented by that, it must apply national company codetermination laws 
even on foreign companies.
176
 Just as with regards to the freedom to provide 
services, the protection of employees is a legitimate general interest that can 
justify a restriction of the freedom of establishment.
177
 The justification 
fails, if the foreign state has an equivilant level of Company 
Codetermination.
178
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10 Labour Leasing 
Another situation in which employees can be sent abroad is a ”labour lease”. 
In such cases, not the implementations of the PWD apply, but the 
implementations of the EU Temporary and Agency Workers Directive
179
 
(2008/104). That means, first of all, that – in the absence of an explicit 
agreement – not the law of the home country, but the law of the host country 
is generally applicable (according to Rome I Art. 8). 
 
Art.3 (1)(f) of the TAWD makes it necessary for the leaser to grant the 
employee equal treatment compared to comparable permanently employed 
employees with regards to pay, working time, rest periods, night work, paid 
holidays, public holidays, pregnancy and motherhood protection, youth 
protection, and anti-discrimination practices. Obviously this also applies to 
foreign employees. 
 
10.1 Differentiation between posted and leased 
workers 
Opposed to a posted worker, a leased worker becomes subject to the 
directive right of  the leaser, and the intention to return to the home state 
must not necessarily be given. 
 
It is usually in the interest of employers to make their posted workers 
subject to the PWD; because of the general ”place of origin”-principle. Not 
only because often the place of origin guarantees a weaker employee 
protection, but also simply because the own jurisdiction is known to the 
employer. Therefore, employers should make sure that the subjective 
intention of the employee to return, which is generally hard to prove, is 
indicated by formal evidence. These can, for instance, derive automatically 
from a project-orientated work abroad (a construction worker, who works 
on a specific construction site). If that is not the case, an agreement with the 
employee to return ”latest after x months” for example, or an agreement on 
the right to call the employer back any time can function as indicators. 
10.2 ECJ-Jurisdiction with regards to Labour Lease 
Also in labour lease situations the ECJ gives guidance about how to treat 
cross-border situations to some extent. Generally, the situation is easier than 
cases of posted workers, because the law of the host country applies 
generally. Nevertheless, there have been a few judgements in which the ECJ 
has set borders to how far Member States can go with the imposition of own 
laws on leased workers from abroad. 
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a) ECJ C-279/80 (Webb, 1983): 
In the absence of the ”TAWD”, the Webb-case dealt only with the european 
freedom of service. In ”Webb”, the claimant Mr.Webb was the CEO of an 
english temporary employment agency. He leased out an employee to the 
Netherlands without having a respective ”labour lease”-permit there, for 
which he was fined by dutch authorities. Mr.Webb argued that this breached 
his freedom of service. The ECJ partially agreed: 
 
On the one hand, Mr.Webb was approved already by english authorities. 
Therefore, it restricts his freedom of service, if he was – opposed to dutch 
competitors – assessed twice. In that sense, the argument of the Netherlands, 
that the assessement was justified because its purpose was the protection of 
the dutch labour market
180
 was rejected by the counter-argument that the 
double-assessement was not necessary. 
 
On the other hand, the english authorities do not know the dutch labour 
market, hence they could not consider dutch circumstances when they 
granted Mr.Webb the permit in England.
181
 As a consequence, the dutch 
authorities can demand a second assessement of Mr.Webb, but only to the 
extent he was not yet assessed before. Circumstances that have been 
considered in England must be accepted as given.
182
 
 
b) ECJ C-279/00 (Commission vs.Italy) 
In this case, the ECJ stated that the legal requirement that temporary 
employment agencies must have their domicile in the domestic state where 
the lease takes place was a breach of the freedom of services as well. 
 
c) ECJ C-493/99 (Commission v. Germany, 2001) 
Germany demanded foreign lessers, that lend out workers to Germany, to 
have a branch in Germany. The ECJ stated that this was a breach of the 
freedom of service of the foreign employer.
183
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11 Cross-border mergers, 
movements and transfers of 
undertakings 
11.1 Situations 
Even though it does not actually fall under the scope of this thesis, to 
complete the topic I want to outline the legal situation in employment law if 
not the employee, but the employer crosses an inner-european border either 
by being taken over by another company (1), or by merging with another 
company (2), or by transferring an undertaking to a new company (3). 
 
a) Cross-Border Takeover 
In case of a cross-border take-over by a share deal without the movement of 
any working sites or an actual change of the formal employer, nothing 
changes at all with regards to the employment contracts, because the 
habitual place of work and the seat of the employer remain the same. 
 
b) Cross-Border Merger 
In case of a cross-border merger, the habitual place of work remains the 
same, but the employer and its seat change. Usually there are no further 
domestic laws that regulate this situation in more detail.
184
 Thereby, there 
are no consequences for the law governing the employment contract, but 
consequences for company codetermination rights of employees. These, as 
well as information rights, are regulated in the national implementations of 
the Directive 2005/56. 
 
c) Cross-Border transfer 
It can also happen that an undertaking is sold by an asset deal. Such cases 
are dealt with in the ”Transfers of Undertakings Directive”(TUD) 
2001/23.
185
 In such a deal, it can also happen that the site of work itself is 
moved across the border. It is relevant for cross-border employment 
relations, because the transfer of an undertaking affects the responsible 
jurisdiction for the employment contract. Its domestic implementations 
basically regulate, that the buyer of an undertaking is bound to the 
employment contracts of the seller. The problem is that the Directive does 
not define what happens if the Transfer of this undertaking takes place over 
national borders.
186
 Which domestic implementation regulates the transfer 
of an undertaking is decided by Art. 8 Rome I
187
, consequently it is usually 
the place from which the undertaking is moved away (either because the 
company is seated there, or because the employees have their habitual 
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workplace there).
188
 Let us assume that this national law has ascertained that 
a transfer of an undertaking in the sense of the domestic implementation of 
the TUD has taken place (e.g. the German federal labour court, just like 
labour courts in almost every Member State
189
 interprets the German 
provision that regulates transfers of undertakings as applicable even to 
cross-border transfers
190
). The applicable legislation changes, in case the 
employment relation is transferred.
191
 For instance, if a storage depot is 
moved over the border to Poland and thereby the habitual workplace of the 
worker, the employment contract is then governed by polish law (unless, of 
course, the worker rejects the transfer of his employment contract).
192
 The 
opinion, that the domestic implementations of the TUD should not be 
applied to cross-border transfers of undertakings, is a minor opinion.
193
 
 
The domestic implementations of the TDU
194
 § 613a are no indispensible 
norms in the sense of Art. 9 Rome I, because they only indirectly serve the 
purposes of a social order, primarily they serve the protection of workers.
195
  
11.2 ECJ C-242/09 (Albron Catering, 2010) 
There is a wide range of judgements of the ECJ to the concretion of the 
Directive
196
, but these do not concern specifically cross-border situations. In 
my opinion, there is only one recent judgement that actually concerns cross-
border situations, which is ECJ C-242/09 (Albron). It is relevant for cross-
border situations, because it concerns the treatment of leased workers. In the 
judgement the ECJ had to assess, weather the leaser – to whom the worker 
formally does not have an employment contract – can be the transferring 
undertaking, with the consequence that the labour lease relationship 
becomes an actual employment relationship with the overtaking company. 
 
With the argument that the Art. 3(1) of Directive 2001/23 uses both 
”employment contracts” and ”employment relationships” as equivilants, the 
court rules that en employment relationship can exist even without an 
employment contract. The ECJ also states that there is no hierarchy between 
the contractual employer, and the factual employment relationship
197
, with 
the consequence that even the leaser can be ”transferor” in the sense of the 
directive. Thereby, if a company is transferred within a Member state, 
eventual employment relations with leased workers will be transferred as 
well. 
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12 Free movement of workers 
The free movement of workers guarantees workers to be treated in every 
European country as if they were a citizen of that country. The free 
movement of workers comprises all workers that carry out economic work 
according to somebody elses directions for a reward.
198
 It guarantees the 
right to search for work abroad, to work abroad, to go abroad and to stay 
abroad.
199
 An exception is the public administration.
200
 By virtue of the case 
law of the ECJ they are also allowed to reside in the Member State where 
they go looking for a job, as long as they can prove that they are really 
looking for a job and have a genuine chance of being engaged.
201
 Prohibited 
are discriminations as well as restrictions.
202
 A restriction of the free 
movement of workers lies in every national act that makes the access to a 
foreign employment market more difficult for an employee.
203
 Indirect 
discriminations are comprised just as direct discriminations.
204
 Restrictions 
of the free movement of workers can be justified by the „orde public“-
exception in Art.45 III TFEU as well as compelling reasons in the general 
interest („Cassis-formula“205).A limit to those justification is the principle of 
proportionality.
206
 
 
Even though this freedom has a wide relevance for workers and there is a 
wide range of judgements on it, for the scope of this analysis it has a minor 
significance. The reason is the following: Art. 45 TFEU aims to prevent 
legislation that keeps foreign workers from immigrating into the respective 
country. The usual question is, weather this national provision was a breach 
of Art. 45 TFEU. It is seldomly a problem, though, which domestic law is 
applicable. It is usually clear that – if the national provision is legal – it must 
be applied to the immigrating worker, because permanently immigrating 
workers always and without exceptions become subject to the legislation of 
the receiving state. 
 
The ECJ has stated repeatedly that posted workers naturally do not fall 
under the scope of Art. 45 TFEU, because it is a natural core condition of 
”postings” that the worker in question does not have the intention to become 
subject to a new legislation
207
, but wants to remain a subject under the 
legislation of his country of origin. 
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Cases in which Art.45 TFEU is relevant with regards to collision laws are 
thereby seldom. The main field in which they might arise are cases of social 
security, with such will be dealt with later in an own chapter. 
 
Apart from that, there are few cases with actual cross-border situations in 
the sense of this analysis. 
 
12.1 ECJ C-202/11 (Las, 2013) 
In C-202/11(Las, 2013)
208
 the ECJ has decided that a national provision that 
demands employees situated within the state to formulate employment-
contracts with a cross-border element always in the language of the home 
state. In this case, a dutch employer with residence in the Netherlands was 
working in Belgium. Its employment contract was written in English, which 
was against belgium law. The employer, who wanted a certain provision of 
the contract to be enforced,claimed that the obligation to formulate contracts 
in dutch was a breach of the free movement of workers. Peculiar about this 
judgement was that the free movement of workers took effect against the 
interest of the employee in this case. That is because not this specific 
employee, but unspecified employees in general are the ones who are 
affected by such a prohibition of foreign languages, because it might keep 
them from working in the Belgium, if they do not speak dutch.
209
 
 
12.2 Horizontal effect 
Article 45, the freedom of movement of workers, binds even private 
parties.
210
 
 
In Walrave/Koch
211
, Dona v Mantero
212
, Bosman
213
 and ”Union Cyclist 
International”214 rules of ”state-like” sports organizations breached the 
freedom of movement of workers. The ECJ ruled that Article 45 TFEU can 
even have horizontal direct effect against national organisations in the area 
of sporting activities.
215
 It has also clarified that it binds collective organs, 
such as work councils or labour Unions.
216
 In Angonese
217
 the ECJ for the 
first time held that Art.45 TFEU was directly applicable even against private 
employers, in this case an austrian Bank that rejected an application of Mr. 
Angonese, because he did not present a specific language certificate, but 
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could prove his ability to speak the language in another way. The ECJ saw a 
breach of his free movement right by the bank.
218
 The ECJ argued with its 
own decision in the case ”Defrenne”219, when it applied Art.157 TFEU – 
that is literally only binding to Member States – to privates. If Art. 157 
TFEU is applied to privates, a fortiori Art. 45 TFEU must be applicable to 
privates, because it does not explicitly state that it only binds states. Lately 
the ECJ conformed its jurisdiction in the case ”Raccanelli”220, when it 
considered a rejection of Mr. Raccanelli as an applicant for a doctoral thesis 
only due to his nationality as a breach of the free movement by the 
international private organization ”Max-Planck-Gesellschaft”. We can 
conclude by now that the free movement is horizontally applicable without 
any restrictions, according to the ECJ. 
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13 Social Security Law 
13.1 Outline 
Even though social security norms are not such of labour law and thereby 
are – strictly seen – not subject of this thesis, I present them shortly anyway 
because they are so closely related to employment relations and highly 
relevant in cross-border situations. In International tax law, there are also 
special provisions for cross-border commuters, but they cannot be dealt with 
here.
221
 
 
Since 2004 there is the EU Regulation 883/2004 (in force since 1. 5. 2010), 
which is directly applicable in all Member States. It is supplemented since 
the EU Regulation 987/2009. They both regulate the conditions and 
modalities of social benefits in cross-border cases. It is a concretion of the 
free movement of workers. Recent jurisdiction about the free movement of 
workers concerns mainly the social security of cross-border commuters.
222
 
 
The basic principle of the Regulation is the one of equality. That means that 
generally, all employees of a member state have the same social rights in 
this state as all citizens of this state. Relevant is the place of work (lex loci 
laboris), even for cross-border commuters.
223
 That basically means that with 
respects to social security, the times that an insurant spent in another 
country must be taken into account as if they had been spend in the country 
in question, for example when it comes to the calculation of retirement 
pensions. 
 
For cross-border commuters there are a few special norms, most 
importantly that retirement pensions depend on the country where the 
employee was working at last (Art. 28).  
 
There are a few exceptions to the „Lex loci laboris“-principle, though. 
 
Receivers of short-term financial aid, as well as sick benefits or parents' 
money, must hold the state of residence responsible (Art. 11 Abs. 2 VO)
224
 
 
For unemployed cross-border commuters, the place of residence is 
responsible (Art. 11 Abs. 2 und 3 c). 
 
State servants are always subject to the social law of their home country, 
and people that work in various countries, so that the place of work cannot 
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clearly be decided, according to Art. 11 Abs. 3 e) VO) the place of residence 
is generally applicable.
225
 
 
For posted workers, the law of the country of origin stays the relevant one 
for the period of 24 months (Art.12). 
13.2 ECJ C-443/11 (Jeltes and others, 2013): 
An unemployed cross-border commuter can claim unemployment benefits 
only in the country of his residence, regardless of close relations to the 
country of his last employment. The ECJ clearly states that the Regulation 
883/2004 must not be interpreted in the light of earlier ECJ-jurisdiction. The 
lack of an explicit expression in the Regulation, that the state of the last 
work was obliged to pay unemployment benefits, was intended by the 
legislator. 
13.3 ECJ C-379/09 (Casteels/British Airways, 2011) 
This case concerned  an additional retirement pension that Germany grants, 
but which Mr. Casteels, an employee of British Airways, did not receive, 
because he was not permenantly employed in Germany.
226
 Mr. Casteels has 
accomplished the necessary minimum years of service, but not in the 
minimum years in Germany that were necessary according to a collective 
agreement.
227
 The ECJ considered that a breach of the free movement of Mr. 
Casteels, because the regulation demotivates employees to leave Germany 
for a temporary work abroad.
228
 A justification of this restriction did not 
exist, so Germany must consider the workyears of Mr. Casteels abroad.
229
 
13.4 ECJ C-542/09 (Kommission / Niederlande, 2012) 
In this case the commission has sued the Netherlands. The Netherlands had 
as a legal requirement for the granting of student funding for students that 
study abroad, that they have lived at least 3 out of the last 6 years in the 
Netherlands before the beginning of the studies.
230
 This requirement can be 
fulfilled easier by dutch employees (or students, which are as pre-workers 
protected by the free movement of workers as well).
231 
 
 
                                                 
225
 Plagemann, Municher Anwaltshandbuch Sozialrecht, § 4 Rd.37 
226
 EuZW 2012, 926, 928 
227
 EuZW 2012, 926, 928 
228
 EuZW 2012, 926, 928 
229
 EuZW 2012, 926, 928 
230
 ECJ, C-542/09; EuZW 2012, 926, 928 
231
 ECJ, C-542/09, Rd.48 ff.; EuZW 2012, 926, 928 
 46 
14 Social Security Law 
As social security laws depend on a variety of specialities that are not 
subject of this thesis, at this point it should just be stated that the general 
guideline with regards to the applicability of domestic laws is valid for 
international taxation and social security situations as well, but it must be 
considered that there is a variety of special legislation and domestic 
jurisdiction that alternatives the result of the applicability of domestic laws. 
For instance, there is an international tax law with special regulations. Also, 
in social security law there are diverse specialities. E.g. according to the EU 
Regulation No. 883/2004 on coordination of social security systems entered 
into force on 1 May 2010, an employee remains subject to the social 
security legislation of the Member State in which he or she pursues a gainful 
activity for 24 months, if he/she is send to another member state. Anyhow, 
in detail tax law and social security law must be assessed individually, 
assumed the general guidance given in this thesis, though. 
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15 Foreign circumstances in 
domestic cases 
Another situation that has not yet been dealt with is the following: A case is 
generally purely domestic in the sense that every employee concerned is 
employed, lives and works in the same country. When domestic laws are 
applied, the question might arise, though, if and to which extent foreign 
circumstances must be taken into account, for example if in case of a mass 
dismissal the social selection can or must include collegues that work 
behind a national border
232, or if a ”small-business-clause” must consider 
employees behind national borders
233
 or if, with regards to company 
codetermination, foreign branches of a mother company must be taken into 
account to count out the number of employees of the corporate group or any 
other example.Obviously, there are no problems visible concerning 
collission laws, the applicable laws are obviously purely domestic. 
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16 Non-discrimination 
16.1 1.Introduction 
Recently, the issue of Anti-discrimination has been subject to a large series 
of ECJ-judgements. That is the consequence of the ”Mangold”-judgement 
from 2005. Even though these cases do not necessarily have relevance for 
cross-border employment, they will be discussed as follows, because it is 
probably the most controversial area in european labour law jurisdiction 
these days. 
 
The European Charta of Fundamental Rights
234
 is binding according to 
Art.6 I TEU and completed by the general principles of the constitutions of 
the member states.
235
 Moreover, there is a set of unwritten fundamental 
rights that the ECJ has recognized that derive from ”the constitutional 
traditions common to the member states."
236
 Both are binding to the EU and 
to the Member States to the extent they are applying or implementing Union 
law. Such an action is given, if the act of the Member State is regulated by 
binding instructions deriving from EU law.
237
  
 
16.2 2.Cases 
There are a several judgments of the ECJ since 2005 in which fundamental 
rights have affected employment relations with regards to national 
implementations of EU directives. 
 
a) ECJ C-144/04 (Mangold, 2005) 
In ”Mangold”, the ECJ dealt with the european fundamental right of age 
non-discrimination. § 14 III 4 TzBfG, the German law on part-time-work 
and fix-term contracts, said that for workers older than 58 (later the age was 
changed to 52), no justification for a fix-term contract longer than two years 
was necessary, whilst for all other employees it was.
238
 The norm was an 
implementation of the EU Directive 99/70 on fixed term work 
 
The ECJ has ascertained that this was an unjustified restriction of the right 
of non-discrimination due to age.
239
 The judgement was subject to a debate 
mainly because of two question-fields: 
 
Firstly, it was debated weather the appraisal and interpretation of the right of 
non-discrimination was correct. Main problems were the following: 
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First, the ECJ seemed to ”mix up” the fundamental european freedom and 
the EU Directive 2000/78 (Employment Equality Framework) as sources of 
this principle, by argueing with the Directive to state the existence of the 
newly ”invented” fundamental right of age non-discrimination.240 This 
confuses the norm hierarchy of Union Law: Secondary legislation can never 
define primary law.
241
 The ECJ then argued for its judgement with primary 
EU law (without clearly stating why it discussed the secondary law issues at 
all then).
242
 
 
The ECJ first stated that there is (without clearly explaining where this 
derives from) a general european principle of the prohibition of 
discrimination with regards to age (inter alia).
243
 This was a main novelty of 
the judgement. 
 
The second debate was on the evaluation that the discrimination was not 
justified even though it actually served the purposes of older employees, 
namely to balance out their disadvantages on the employment market. Many 
scholars argued that the exemption of § 14 III TzBfG was legal despite the 
discriminatory character, because it fights disadvantages of older applicants 
on the labour market, which was an objective justification.
244
 The ECJ 
opposed to this point of view, because the balancing advantages of the older 
employees could not be proven.
245
 Anyhow, such debates can be made in 
every case when the ECJ evaluates the justification of restrictions on 
fundamental freedoms. This evaluation was therefore not the main novelty 
of the judgement. 
 
The most remarkable peculiarity of the case was that the implementation 
period for the respective directive (2000/78) was not yet over by the time of 
the judgement. Directives can be enforced, according to ECJ jurisdiction
246
, 
when it is unconditional, sufficiently precise and the implementation period 
has run out.
247
 The ECJ held the directive as sufficiently precise and 
unconditional. But its implementation period had not yet run out. The ECJ 
has nevertheless applied the Directive already.
 248
  This problem was 
overcome by stating that the lowering of the age threshold from 58 to 52 
violated the principle that during an implementation period no counter-
productive legislative measures must be taken and thereby measuring the 
directive on primary law was legal exceptionally.
249
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In other fields, like the ”social selection” in German unfair dismissal law, 
age groups are common. To the extent they exist today, they were not 
contested and seem to be justified.
250
 
 
b) ECJ C-411/05 (Palacios de la Villa, 2007) 
Despite all critique the ECJ confirmed its jurisdiction concerning the newly 
discovered existence of a fundamental right of age non-discrimination.
251
 In 
this case it objected a breach, though: It held the provision of a collective 
agreement, which forced employees into retirement by the age of 65, as a 
proportionate mean to protect the labour market.
252
 
 
c) ECJ C-300/06 (Voß, 2007) 
In this judgement, the ECJ stated that part-time workers and full-time 
workers must receive the same hourly overtime-wage. Otherwise, the law in 
question was a discrimination of women, because significantly more women 
work part-time. The judgement goes very far, I think. Because the criterion 
that decides if there is a discrimination is not a static (for example caused by 
physical traits of women), but a fluent one, namely purely statistical: The 
high percentage of women in part-time work. That means, that if the 
percentage of part-time-working women decreases, at some point – an 
undefined point - the judgement would lose effect and differing hourly 
wages would become legal again. 
 
d) ECJ C-88/08 (Hütter, 2009) 
In ”Hütter”, tje ECJ considered an austrian law invalid that defined that, for 
employees in the public service, working years before the 18th year of age 
must not be considered when it comes to the account of salary levels. Work 
experience, but not age itself must be the link to salary groups. 
 
e) ECJ C-341/08 (Petersen, 2010) 
In ”Petersen”, the ECJ held a German provision that a dentist must not be 
older than 68 years of age as invalid due to an age discrimination, in case 
the goal of this provision is the protection of patients. In this case, the 
provision is not necessary, because health assessements work just as well. 
Only, if the provision has the aim of a functioning labour market for 
dentists, the discrimination can be  justified. The aim of the provision is up 
to the national courts to ascertain. 
 
f) ECJ C-555/07 (Kücükdeveci, 2010) 
In ”Kücükdeveci” the ECJ had to decide, weather a national provision that 
ignored working times before the 25th year of age when it comes to the 
calculation of employment termination periods was justified, and neglected 
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this question. The ECJ saw an age discrimination
253
 in this provision.
254
 In 
its reasoning, it has clarified parts of the confusion that derived from 
”Mangold”. It has stated – clearly this time – the existence of an 
independent prohibition of age discrimination as a principle of primary EU 
law.
255
 The mentioned Directive 2000/78 was merely a concretion of this 
principle.
256257
 In other words, the direct applicability of the Directive 
against the clear wording of § 622II 2 BGB did not derive from the 
Directive itself, but from the primary law principle of non-discrimination 
”behind” the directive.258259 
 
It also clarified that it sticks to its traditional jurisdiction that there is no 
pre-applicability of Directives before the expiration of the implementation 
period (despite the debate that derived from ”Mangold”).260 
 
g) ECJ C-250/09 (Georgiev, 2010) 
In this case, the ECJ rejected the complaint about age discrimination by a 
bulgarian Professor, who was retired by the age of 68 by law, but against his 
will.
261
 The ECJ held this discrimination as justified, because it 
proportionally served the legitimate aim of regulating the employment 
market, namely the distribution of Professor-positions in all generations. 
 
h) ECJ C-45/09 (Rosenbladt, 2010) 
A similar case and judgement was ”Rosenbladt”. Mrs. Rosenbladt was 
forced into retirement by the age of 65 due to a collective agreement. The 
speciality of this case was that the retirement pension of Mrs. Rosenbladt 
amounted up to only 250 €, obviously not enough to make a living. The ECJ 
stuck to its Palacios-jurisdiction anyway. 
 
i) ECJ C-159/10 and C-160/10 (Fuchs,2011) 
In ”Fuchs” the ECJ declared an age limit of 65 for national prosecutors as in 
accordance with the principle of non-discrimination with reference to its 
argumentation in ”Palacios” and ”Rosenbladt”. 
 
j) ECJ C-499/08 (Andersen, 2010) 
Danish dismissal protection law foresaw that, in case of mass dismissals, 
employees that receive a national or company pension receive a lower  pay-
off. The ECJ considered that a discrimination on grounds of age, because 
employees that, despite their  right to receive a pension, want to remain 
working, must not be underpriviliged because of that. 
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k) ECJ C-447/09 (Prigge/Lufthansa, 2011) 
In Prigge v. Lufthansa, though, a strict age limit of 60 for pilots due to a 
collective agreement was a breach of the principle of non-discrimination. 
The difference to the preceding cases was that the goal of this age limit was 
not the protection of the labour market, but air traffic security. The ECJ held 
that, for this purpose, a strict age limit was not necessary, because physical 
assessements were sufficient as long as the pilots are in perfect health (same 
as in the ”Petersen”-judgement). 
 
l) ECJ C-297/10 and C 298/10 (Hennings, 2011) 
In ”Hennings”, the ECJ held a collective agreement invalid, which 
determined the salary according to age-groups in the public sector. It 
explicitly stated that, with regards to equal treatments, tariff parties should 
have a wide discretion, which was, in this case, nevertheless exceeded. 
 
m) ECJ C-132/11 (Tyrolean Airways, 2012) 
Tyrolean Airways had a collective agreement that defined a raise of salary 
after the third year of work in this company.
262
 Work years in the same 
concern were not considered. The ECJ did not see a discrimination on 
grounds of age in that, because working times for another company in the 
same concern do affect the date when an employee was hired, but 
independently from his age. The clause does not have any relation to age, so 
that there was no discrimination. The judgement shows that the ECJ was 
serious with its expressed intention to give tariff parties a wide discretion. 
 
n) ECJ C-152/11, (Odar, 2012) 
After ”Andersen”, there was irritation about the question weather the right 
to receive early retirement pensions for older employers shortly before their 
retirement could still be considered when it comes to the calculation of pay-
offs in social plans, as it is habit in many countries. The ECJ declared that 
this was still possible, only an early retirement due to a disability must not 
be considered.
263
 Otherwise the social advantage of early retirement, which 
is a mean to balance out disadvantages due to disability, would be 
circumvented and taken away again by a lowered pay-off.. 
 
o) ECJ C-141/11 (Hörnfeldt, 2012) 
In ”Hörnfeld”, the ECJ judged that the right to be dismissed by the age of 67 
was a proportionate mean to protect the labour market and thereby can 
justify a restriction of the principle of non-discrimination. The novelty of 
this judgement was the following: Mr. Hörnfeldt argued that in his case, his 
pension would (due to several personal circumstances with and their 
treatment by swedish retirement laws), rise significantly if he could work 
for only two more years. The ECJ rejected this argument, though. This 
                                                 
262
 EuGH, Urt. v. 7. 6. 2012 – C-132/11 
263
 ECJ C-152/11 
 53 
stands in accordance with the Rosenbladt-judgement, which shows that the 
ECJ does not seem to consider economic circumstances of the employee 
when it evaluates a breach of the principle of non-discrimination. I agree 
with the ECJ on this, because the goal of the principle of non-discrimination 
is equality, and not to set minimum social or economic standards. 
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17 Summary: How to deal with 
cross-border employment 
situations 
 
At last, I want to sum up the results of this analysis in all the at the 
beginning presented situations. 
 If an employer sends an employee abroad temporarily, the domestic 
implementations of the PWD regulate, which laws from the home 
country and which from the host country will be applied. In this 
assessment, the presented ECJ jurisdiction must be considered, 
generally there is a tendency to restrict the power of host countries by 
the ECJ. 
 If an employer sends an employee abroad permanently, this can either be 
interpreted as an implicitly agreed new employment contract, with the 
result that the laws of the new country are applicable on the new 
contract
264
, otherwise Rome I Art. 8 and 9 are applicable, with the 
result that generally (with possible exceptions) the laws of the new 
country is applicable as the „lex loci laboris“. 
 If an employee occasionally crosses the border to work abroad, that is in 
every possible way irrelevant for the applicability of the laws of the 
home country. 
 If an employee permanently works in two (or more) countries, it must 
still be assessed according to Rome I Art.8, if there is a „habitual“ 
place of work. Only if that is truly impossible, the place of the 
employing branch is decisive. 
 For cross-border commuters, the „lex loci laboris“ is applicable, with 
possible exceptions only in social and tax law. 
 If an employer leases out an employee cross-border, the laws of the host 
country are generally applicable (Rome I Art.8). 
 If a contract is suspended and a new contract abroad is concluded, onto 
the new contract the laws of the host state are applicable without any 
problem. 
  In case of „split contract“ situations, two legislations are applicable on 
the respective employment contract that they govern. 
 An employee works, lives and is employed in the same country, 
domestic law decides to which extent foreign circumstances might 
play a role in the application of domestic laws. 
 In cases of takeovers or mergers across the border without an actual 
change of the place of work, nothing changes. 
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 In case of a transfer of an undertaking with an actual replacement of the 
place of work across a border, the national laws of the home country 
decide whether the employment contract is transferred across the 
border or not in the sense of the TUD. In case it is, it becomes subject 
to the new legislation after the transfer due to Rome I. 
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